

Stability at the Political-Administrative Interface

DPME Research Unit
13 June 2019



planning, monitoring
& evaluation

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Name of the Report

Stability at the political-administrative interface

Secondary info

A Synthesis report

KEY MESSAGES

- ◆ There is consensus that a high turnover rate of DGs and HoDs is prevalent in the South African public service, which has negative outcomes on departmental performance and service delivery.
- ◆ There is however, variations in reporting on the tenure of DGs and HoDs, which is attributed to data sources, samples and method of analysis. 'Averages' may not be a reliable measure of turnover, and while 'survival analysis' is used in this study, agreement is still needed on measurement of DG/HoD tenure.
- ◆ Interventions to improve administrative capacity, clarify roles, or address challenges contributing to these high turnover rates are reported to be inadequate, not effectively implemented and not addressing systemic causes.
- ◆ Executive Authorities in some successful developmental states are not involved in the appointment of top administrative bureaucrats as the function sits with a centralized authority.
- ◆ Evidence shows that the absence of centralized oversight functions and meritocratic recruitment in the bureaucracy is generally seen as producing public administrations that are inflated, inefficient, ineffective and lacking in autonomy from political leaders.
- ◆ Support to the Executive Authority in achieving developmental priorities i.e. **responsiveness**, as well as maintaining a high standard of **professionalism** in the public service, will be best achieved through a contextualized hybrid model of HoD recruitment, selection, management and oversight with institutional agreements to implement political, legal and technical recommendations arising out of this report.

Who requested this output?

The Acting DDG of Sector Monitoring branch in January 2018

This report includes:

- ◆ International analysis of Developmental States
- ◆ Contextual review (SA evidence)
- ◆ Administrative data analysis

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1. Study Context

Tensions between the political and administrative interphase and instability of the administrative leadership are persistent challenges faced by the South African government (NPC 2011: Chapter 13). Lack of clarity about the division of roles and responsibilities between political principals and administrative heads have been argued to contribute to the tension and underperformance of the three spheres of government, which impact negatively on service delivery. There is strong association that the best performing public sector institutions are characterised by leadership stability. Frequent changes in executive and administrative heads have implications for achieving strategic national priorities, leads to instability and discontinuity in departments, and indicates a weakened administration that has to interface with the Executive Authority (PSC 2017).

Evidence suggest that high turnover of the top levels of senior public officials in the South African public service is worsening over the recent years, with signs of weakened state capacity to deliver on developmental objectives. The demand for evidence on the extent, depth and impact of instability at the political-administrative interface is growing from all fronts for purposes of accountability, performance updates and progress on service delivery. While there is already much known on the problem of turnover of DGs/HoDs, findings differ with regard to averages and causes. International experience show that South Africa can learn from lessons.

2. Problem Statement

Consistently high turnover rates of DGs and HoDs and extended acting positions remain characteristic of the South African public service. Currently there exists uncertainty and unevenness in the security of tenure of DGs and HoDs, which questions the effectiveness of retention strategies. The NDP argues that senior level posts are clouded with political interference in terms of recruitment and reporting. Furthermore, lack of accountability and weak administrative authority impacts negatively on service delivery. The high turnover of DGs and HoDs suggests administrative turmoil and makes continuity and the allocation of responsibility for service-delivery outcomes challenging.

There is a need to measure the extent to which the problem of turnover of DGs/HoDs exists, and understand why known challenges persist, and review what interventions are in place nationally and internationally. In the absence of accurate and reliable baselines to measure tenure in South Africa, there is a need to generate accurate data from which to effectively monitor the tenure of DGs and HoDs in the SA public sector.

3. Scope and Purpose of the Study

Heightened concerns by the media and citizens on leadership challenges over the recent past, and research reports on high turnovers of DGs/HoDs in the public service provided the thrust for a government-led research study. This report is the culmination of 12 months of collaborative research undertaken by senior public officials from key government departments, and guided by a reference team that provided oversight. This study does not address the effectiveness of the various interventions to date, as these interventions require specific evaluations individually. The study report will be provided to the reference group and DPME management, to take the report forward, communicate the report to relevant stakeholders and use the findings.

The purpose of undertaking this study by Department of Planning Monitoring and Evaluation (DPME) is two-fold:

- DPME's mandate for sector monitoring and performance assessment: Outcome 12 in this regard is a core reporting function for DPME. One of its eight objectives is to monitor the stability of the political-administrative interface through measuring the retention of HoDs. Furthermore, DPME was requested to conduct a study on how long DGs and HoDs spent in their respective posts at a regular reporting cycle to cabinet in November 2017.
- Assessment of NDP implementation: To inform implementation of chapter 13 of the NDP and address the evidence needs in building a research agenda on the Capable and Developmental State.

4. Objectives, Methodology and Study Governance

The study is aimed at addressing the research needs of decision makers, broadly in understanding what an effective, responsive and capable public service constitutes, and to build an evidence base to inform on-going work. Since much research already exists in effective public administration and management, the starting point was to provide a review of existing evidence from scientific databases, government sources, and think tanks. The NDP diagnostic used data and research available at the time. This requires updating and contextualising the findings to guide the development of intervention strategies for improving and stabilizing DG/HoD tenure.

Objectives of the study

1. Synthesise the findings from international cases in addressing challenges at the political-administrative interface and promote professionalism in the public service.
2. Provide contextual analysis and review of existing research on recruitment, retention and tenure of DGs and HoDs in the South African Public Service
3. Develop a database to determine baselines, explore appropriate methodology to measure tenure and undertake secondary data analysis (using administrative data) in understanding the length of time DGs and HoDs remain in service across three terms of office in government.
4. Recommend implementation strategies for effective administrative leadership in the South African government.

Methodology

A mixed methods approach was adopted, using synthesis as well as secondary data analysis to meet the objectives. This was necessary, because existing evidence was sourced and analysed to understand what the body of evidence is pointing to and what knowledge gaps exist.

Evidence synthesis

Six international reviews were sourced and analysed from literature on the Developmental State, which looked into State capacity and the issue of political-administrative challenges in maintaining professionalism as well as responsiveness. These reviews are useful in that they collectively synthesised a considerable number of primary studies in order to generate an integrated body of work across developmental contexts and differing approaches. It thus forms the basis of a meta-analysis and are listed in annex 1 as the sample from which the findings are reported on.

Review of existing evidence on South Africa

Evidence was sourced, screened for relevance and data extracted from a base of primary research reports on South Africa. This was necessary in order to understand what evidence exists, and track its findings as related to implementation. This part provides a contextual analysis, and aligns the findings to Chapter 13 of the NDP on the 'Capable and Developmental State'.

External evidence (scientific databases, websites and media), Government outputs and internal (DPME) evidence were sourced. These were screened for relevance from which a set of studies were included for interrogation. A sample of 24 national and international studies (where SA is included), formed our evidence base (refer to annexure 2). We engaged with a filtered set of research and other evidence, which primarily focused on DGs, and HoDs in South Africa including their counterparts from international literature, in order to draw lessons and inform our work going forward.

Measurement of tenure and secondary data analysis

There is a general lack of data on the terms DGs/HoDs served, and which is suitable for the analysis of duration in service. The data specialist in the team found that a baseline dataset was not readily available to address the third objective. None of DPSA, OPSC or GCIS was able to provide such data stretching back enough years to enable a comprehensive analysis. The team prioritised the need to generate a dataset, which key experts within Government could use to provide accurate and transparent analyses. This constituted the development of effective measurement of tenure to address the concerns around data credibility, reliability and quality for reporting, research and analysis.

The most complete source available to the working group was derived from administrative PERSAL data. PERSAL is a computerized online integrated system used by all national and provincial government departments to manage aspects related to government regulations, prescripts, instructions and policies regarding human resources. The complete PERSAL HeadPosts datasets available in National Treasury were extracted, cleaned and analysed for the financial years 2006/07 to 2017/18. These datasets are monthly personnel records of all active personnel in all national and provincial departments. The two main reasons for this part of the study are to provide an analysis of the tenure of DGs and HoDs based on credible and reliable data, and to create a base dataset, using appropriate methodology to monitor duration of terms going forward.

Study governance

A reference group was nominated to oversee the research project. The objective of this group was to ensure access to data, relevance, effective coordination and contribution from the partners to support the research process and to facilitate the use of the findings. Individuals were nominated from various units within DPME, GTAC/National Treasury, the Department of Public Service Administration (DPSA) and the Office of the Public Service Commission (OPSC). Three commissioners from the National Planning Commission (NPC) also attended the reference group meetings to ensure contribution of the study to Chapter 13 of the NDP. There was no attendance by DPSA officials at the reference group meetings, while the OPSC participated in an advisory capacity. The overall group met twice over the ten-month period, and a smaller technical task team met more often during the data cleaning and analysis phase. A third and final reference group meeting will serve to disseminate the findings and finalize the reporting process.

5. Findings

The findings of the study are reported in three sections. The first section provides findings from the synthesis of international literature on the experience and lessons from other countries. The six reviews are used to provide a meta-analysis of more than 450 primary studies (refer to Annexure 2). The second section provides a review of primary studies to date, on what the challenges were, interventions introduced and progress made to overcome high turnover of DGs and HoDs in South Africa. The third section provides a methodology to measure the duration of service by senior officials and secondary analysis of administrative data.

5.1 International evidence on political-administrative stability

This section of the report provides a high level analysis of lessons learned from international cases and studies relevant to this study.

Representation, recruitment and resources

Three important structural factors shape the politics-bureaucracy interface in developing countries and its impact on public sector reform. Institutional arrangements define representation of formal actors. Recruitment of technical skills is aimed at promoting a functional bureaucracy, and financial resources shape the way in which bureaucrats and political principals interact.

- ◆ Institutional - These are the powers given to politicians and bureaucrats by the country's formal and informal political 'rules of the game'. Formal institutions usually give politicians a higher position in the decision-making hierarchy, but in more advanced democracies, the constitution give bureaucrats some protection from dismissal by political leaders. Limited terms of political office can mean that in democratic nations bureaucrats' tenure is longer than that of politicians.
- ◆ Technical - Bureaucrats' are recruited for their technical skills where their main resource is knowledge and expertise about the sector which they apply to the political and policy processes. Where bureaucrats have more knowledge of a policy than politicians do, they are more likely to be granted greater autonomy in the policy process.
- ◆ Financial - Political leaders generally have greater control over a country's material resources, and this increases bureaucrats' responsiveness to their demands. However, specific ministries within a bureaucracy may have significant influence over the allocation of funds. Some ministries may also have more access to finance than others, for example as a recipient of external funding.

Meritocratic bureaucracy and career progression

Meritocratic recruitment and career progression is one of the key features of Weber's ideal type bureaucracy. This has also been identified in the literature as a key factor distinguishing developmental states (meritocratic) from more neo-patrimonial ones with personalised recruitment (Dasandi 2014). Evidence points to successful developmental and mature states that have limited political influence in the appointments of senior public officials, with only the minister being a political appointee. All other officials are technocrats and appointments are based on qualification, experience and abilities. Countries such as Mauritius, Malaysia, Brazil, Sweden and Australia some of which adopt the Westminster system appoint officials based on merit and have limited political influence (Dasandi 2014; Lodge et al 2013; PSC 2016). The DPL (2014) report argues that even though recruitment and hiring are based on meritocratic principles, bureaucrats in developmental

states are more politicised than the Weberian ideal.

Singapore, China, India, France, Sweden and the United States have political influence but still appoint based on merit (Dasandi 2014; IPPR 2013; PSC 2016). In China for example, loyalty and party membership influences appointment – party members constitute only 5% of the population and 80% of public sector posts (Burns 2007 cited in PSC (2016)). In India, bureaucrats are protected from dismissal but promotion and transfer tend to be politically influenced (Dasandi 2014). Evidence suggests that in some countries, career progression is one area in which politicians seek to influence the bureaucracy. This is particularly relevant in the case of India. In Brazil, political appointments are not based on political loyalty (Dasandi 2014) and in New Zealand, even ministers' appointments are facilitated by an independent body; the State Service Commission (IPPR 2013).

Singapore is described as the most efficient and least corrupt country, with highly paid public officials whose senior appointments are facilitated through an agency like the Public Service Commission (IPPR 2013). Singapore is known for being non-partisan and has a closed system where most senior public officials come from a prestigious administrative service and are contracted on the basis of their school achievement before they even go to university. Public servants are selected from a list provided by the PSC, which is then consulted with minister before appointments are made. The political administrative relationships are close knit and both ministers and the administrative heads have similar backgrounds (IPPR 2013).

Malaysia has an interesting case regarding the appointments and management of senior officials. The Promotion Board, made up of the Chief Secretary to Government, DG, PSC and the SG of the Ministry of Finance provide a pool of top career civil servants and the PSC conducts interviews. The Prime Minister recommends the incumbent and the king appoints based on the recommendation (PSC 2016). The minister is regarded as custodian of the state hence the DG and SG loyalty is to the King. Conflicts between the DG and minister are therefore mediated by the Chief Secretary of Government and DG of the Public Service. Contracts of senior officials in countries such as Brazil and Belgium are dependent on the political term of office (Dasandi 2014; ESID 2013; Matheson et.al. 2013). New Zealand and Sweden have fixed term contracts (IPPR 2013). Senior public officials in Sweden have a three-year term, and are usually retained within the public service system after the term ends. It is reported that bureaucrats and politicians respect each other in Sweden and treat each other as equals (IPPR 2013).

Class and educational background

Part of the explanation for the shared set of values and vision among politicians and bureaucrats in developmental states is that they often had similar class and/or higher education backgrounds. In the case of Botswana, significant attention has been given to senior politicians and bureaucrats coming from the same cattle-owning class. Furthermore, in a number of different developmental contexts, political leaders and senior bureaucrats had formed close ties at elite universities before entering the public service (see Evans 1989; Johnson 1992; Jones et al. 2014 cited in Dasandi 2014).

Core developmental elite with a shared developmental vision

Developmental states are noted for the presence of a core developmental elite, centred on a small group of senior politicians and bureaucrats close to the head of the executive (Leftwich 1995 cited in Dasandi 2014). This core elite is noted for its intimate working relationships, which establish the

principles of the regime. Singapore was one such country that had an elite with close knit political-administrative relationships of individuals that were pooled from a prestigious administrative service and had similar backgrounds (IPPR 2013).

A shared developmental vision is regarded as key to the success of countries. A consequence of these shared values and goals is that bureaucrats are far more politicised in developmental states than the politically neutral Weberian ideal.

Influence of bureaucrats on policy design

Evidence analysed during the economic boom of developmental states show that a defining characteristic of policy-making is the significant influence that senior bureaucrats (part of the developmental elite) have on policy design, particularly when compared to western democracies (Charlton 1991; Johnson 1981, 1982; Leftwich 1995 cited in Dasandi 2014). This influence is particularly important and prominent for key economic ministries and agencies, such as the Ministry of Trade and Industry (MITI) in Japan (Evans 1992; Johnson 1982 cited in Dasandi 2014). A useful typology is provided in a synthesis report across states where two variables: degree of bureaucratic autonomy and separation of roles between politicians and bureaucrats was found to define the nature of the state (refer to table 1).

Table 1 A typology of political-bureaucratic relations across states
(*Developmental Leadership Program*¹)

		Autonomy of bureaucrats	
		Low	High
Separation of roles between politicians and bureaucrats	Low	'Predatory' states	'Developmental' States
	High	'Developing' nations	'Developed' nations

More recent studies by South Africa's PSC in learning from international cases show that in Malaysia, ministers set the broad development framework such as the national development vision and the five-year national plans and senior officials buy into the agenda and devise policy tools to achieve the developmental goals set by the ruling party (PSC 2016). Furthermore, performance agreements of DG/SGs are contracted with the DG of the Public Service, who is the second most senior bureaucrat (PSC 2016).

5.2. Contextual review

There is a growing body of national and international evidence generated on the functioning of political-administrative interfaces, its related challenges and the implications thereof. Many research studies were found on effectiveness and general human resource management in the public service. However, our focus was on the most senior level of administration whose role it is to work with the political leadership in order to ensure effective design, implementation and evaluation of public policy. In recent years, there is an emphasis on understanding how political and bureaucratic leaders

¹Reproduced from Dasandi, N. 2014. The politics-bureaucracy interface: impact on development reform. UCL, UK

relate to one another. Concerns stated in the National Development Plan Vision 2030 regarding high turnover and instability at the political administrative interface have been affirmed by many separate research reports, yet there seems to be little progress to follow-through on recommendations and using the evidence generated to improve the situation. Critical interventions and recommendations were already made over the past decade by key agencies and researchers in the field. The question is why decisions are not made and changes implemented. This depends on the context within which all this evidence is expected to be used.

Reporting on average turnover

The PSC, academia and media have reported on the average turnover of DGs and HoDs with some reports going deeper into providing department-specific performance. While the actual average figures differ (due to variations in the data), there is consensus that the average turnover is too high. Analysis of DPME data and other research outputs show a relationship between leadership and performance of a department (Lodge, 2013; DPME 2017). DPSA reports (PSC, 2017) that at the national level, the average length of service is just over 3,5 years, whereas the average for provinces is below 3 years. According to the DPSA, the average time spent by HoDs in a post has improved over the past three years from 2.7 years to 3.08 years. A synopsis of the turnover rate is provided below:

Table 2 Reporting on average tenure

	DPSA/ PSC	Academia (SAIRR2)	Media
Average turnover (2017)	3,5 years (National) 2,9 years (Provincial)	1,10 years (National)	2,9 years (National) Business live3

Table 3 State of stability of national departments

Departments with high instability (average and <, not in order of priority)	
Academia (Van Onselen 2017 - SAIRR)	McCan, J. and Grant, L. 2014 (Mail & Guardian)
1. Communications	1. Public Service and Admin
2. Agriculture, Forestry & Fishery	2. Agriculture, Forestry & Fishery
3. Basic education	3. Public Works
4. Cooperative Governance	4. Co-operative Governance
5. Water & Sanitation	5. Basic Education
6. Public Service & Administration	6. Communications
7. Social Development	7. Labour
8. Correctional Services	8. Women
9. Labour	9. Defence
10. Police	10. Police
11. Public Works	11. Water & Sanitation
12. Women	12. Transport
13. Arts & Culture	13. Correctional Services
14. Defence	14. Health
15. Economic Development	15. Independent Police Investigation Directive
16. Human Settlements	

2 Van Onselen, 2017. Musical Chairs. South African Institute of Race Relations.

3 Magubane, K. 2017. Rapid turnover of directors-general worries Public Service Commission. Business Live. Accessed: <https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/national/2017-09-22-rapid-turnover-of-directors-general-worries-public-service-commission/>

17. International relations 18. Public Enterprises 19. Rural Development & LR 20. Transport	16. Public enterprises 17. Sport 18. Arts and Culture 19. Justice & Constitutional development 20. GCIS 21. Human Settlements 22. Rural Development & LR 23. Economic Development 24. Social Development
Departments with some degree of stability (5 year tenure and/or consecutive terms)	
Home Affairs Environmental Affairs Science & Technology	Stats SA Science & Technology Environmental Affairs (Performance) Planning Monitoring and evaluation

Van Onselen (2017) asserted that over a period of eight years, national departments were subjected to cabinet reshuffle every 9 months and change of DGs every 22 months. The average time spent between a minister and a DG, at a particular point would be around 14 months and about 47% of DGs were acting in these positions (Van Onselen, 2017). Low tenure, breed chaos, uncertainty and disorder and paints a picture of instability, poor planning, conflict and perpetual turmoil. Van Onselen (2017) argues that politics has a major role to play since national administration reflects the factional agenda underpinned in the political space. In 2014, the Mail & Guardian featured an article, which reported that there have been 177 permanent and acting Directors-General in 45 government departments between 2009-2014. DPME's POA reports provide the average retention rates in tables 3 and 4 below, including disaggregated for national and provincial.

Table 4 Retention of HoDs measured by the average number of years spent in a post (2014-2017)





Table 5 Retention of HoDs measured by the average number of years spent in a post for provincial and national departments



The PSC (2008) found that HoD turnover was constant, with an incident at least every month and that four months after the 2004 elections, nine incidents of HoDs turnover were recorded. Most turnover during the period 2003/4 and 2006/7 were transfers and not terminations (PSC, 2008).

Policy coherence and role clarity

The Public Service Act No. 103 of 1994, Section 3 provides for the Executive Authority, via the President, who delegates to the Minister, the function of recruiting HoDs. This is regarded as the sunset clause included in the PSA during the early years of democracy for the purpose of transformation. However, this clause was never reviewed and lacks any timeframes. There is an increasing call by key stakeholders to review this clause in the PSA, particularly in the light of events emerging in the last two administrations (PSC 2017; PARI 2018).

PFMA bestows both the accountability and authority for financial management on the accounting officer (HoD) whilst the PSA confers powers regarding human resources and organisational structures on the EAs

PSC 2016


In addition, there is incoherence in the PSA and the PFMA in terms of Human Resources (HR) and financial accountability. The PSA makes the political leader accountable for HoD performance while the PFMA makes the Accounting Officer within the administration accountable for financial performance. Overall accountability on management and performance of the department is thus split. This is reported to be the core problem from a legal perspective. Van Onselen (2017) asserted that the PFMA gives the National Treasury the power to appoint DGs under exceptional circumstances. The PSC (2017) argues that EAs are hesitant in delegating authority, and these impact on departments’ functionality and effectiveness. Proposals to shift the recruitment and management of human resource from the executive to the HoDs, have been implemented for lower level staff (Chief Directors and below), though there is evidence of the executive still influencing the recruitment of administrative staff (PSC 2017).

The Senior Management Services (SMS) was designed to build a mechanism of attracting and retaining competent managers, manage performance and career incidents, and also promote ethical conduct within the public sector (PSC 2011). The SMS Handbook and Executive Protocol have not been updated to further guide on career incidents and there are problems with the interpretation of certain sections of the Public Service Act (PSA) on the management of career incidents. According to the PSC (2017), the lack of responsibility and role clarity tends to create tensions and uncertainties, especially in cases where the objectives of the EA are not aligned with those of the HODs. Misalignment between the expectations of EAs and strategic goals and objectives of departments undermines the execution of administrative duties and leads to tensions between EAs and HoDs, and further affects the performance of HoDs, the departments and ultimately service delivery (PSC 2017). The role confusion is also exacerbated by the Special Advisors to the ministers, which at times run parallel with those of the HOD (PSC 2017).

“... the public service is characterised by: a prevalence of muddled understandings of the challenges facing the nation; cultural and political clashes between officials; the lack of any common ethos; the absence of uniform training; limited loyalty in the service; little commitment to excellence; failures of proactive or anticipatory governance; high mobility of public officials in pursuit of senior positions, resulting in limited institutional memory; and excessively rapid turnover of Director Generals and Heads of Departments [HoDs] ”
(Butler, 2008, p. 193 cited in Kraak, 2011).

Reporting by the PSC has made the challenges around roles and responsibilities explicit. The confusion in roles, over-extension of roles, inappropriate political interference in daily management and unfunded mandates illustrates further challenges between political principals and administrative heads (PSC 2016). A causal path (problem tree analysis) is provided from the findings by the PSC that leads to poor outcomes and unintended consequences:

Figure 1 Problem analysis (causal path)



Relationship between executive and administrative authorities

Research in public administration states that competence to perform the job is a critical factor for effective bureaucratic functioning. However, the PSC reports that it is the relationship between the EAs (i.e. politicians) and the administrative authority (HoDs), not necessarily competence to perform the job, which determines the length of the tenure of an HoD (PSC 2017). In this regard, 89% of the HoDs surveyed, believe that their security of tenure is directly linked to their relationships with EAs and 61% felt that change in political leadership of a department results in change in HoDs (PSC 2008). Updating this survey results would provide a useful comparator.

Contract period

Introducing a contract period post democracy into the public service for DGs and HoDs is reported to be part of the transformative agenda by the PSC and DPSA. DGs were employed “for life” during the apartheid government. Although the Senior Management Service (SMS) Handbook in SA provides for a contract period that should not exceed 5 years, the PSC reported that “a convention emerged where the majority of DGs and HoDs, especially at National level, were appointed for a 3-year term prior to 2008” (PSC, 2009). Three-year contracts are perceived as too short to allow DGs/HoDs to make any meaningful impact. After considerable investigations and consultations with the DGs, it was found that the 3-year contract resulted in insecurity for the individuals as well as instability in running the departments. Following this finding, the PSC recommended strongly to review the contract period and Cabinet then communicated a directive to secure 5-year contract periods by the incoming administration in 2009. Entering into 5-year contracts became the norm after 2009 and served to move beyond the problem of contracts as the source of high turnovers. Despite this directive, very few DGs completed a full term after 2009, or were moved after Cabinet reshuffles during their terms (Van Onselen 2017; McCan & Grant 2014). This is confirmed by our own data analysis in the next section.

Technical, managerial and professional competence

An international review identified the inability of governments to retain skilled and qualified workers, which impacts on the sector’s capacity to formulate and implement developmental policies and programmes (ESID 2013). Cadre deployment was highlighted in South African reports which result in the appointment of heads with limited technical expertise, management and leadership incompetence’s. These impact negatively on the functioning of departments and further contributes to the marginalisation of competent, technical and skilled individuals, threatening job security of HoDs. The environment of victimisation increases the risk, stress and lack of desirability to remain in office (PSC 2017). At times, DG contracts are not renewed after elections and in other cases because of poor performance, maladministration or misconduct. There are also times when DGs remain in the public service, but are transferred to other departments, while in other instances, they are used to edge out HoDs until their contracts expire.

Baseline data to effectively measure and monitor retention of HoDs

In sourcing for evidence to inform the review, the core research team found it difficult to access information or the actual data behind the reports and analyses that were used. Averages are reported, without transparency in sampling methods, or how DGs and acting DGs were identified. This is elaborated on in more detail in the next section; however, the critical issue to note is the absence of a reliable dataset from which the key stakeholders (DPSA, NT, PSC, DPME, NPC) could

monitor progress and provide an analysis from a single source of a cleaned, reliable data set. This becomes a key data challenge, especially in the light of the 25 Year Review and the setting of strategic priorities for the next medium term. The sub-outcome of “a stable political-administrative interface” is included. Progress is observed in developing a revised PMDS for HoDs and a “Directive on the Performance Management and Development System (PMDS) for HoDs” has been documented by the DPSA, awaiting final approval.

The following two tables demonstrate reporting by the performance monitoring team in DPME, where Table 6 is one of 8 indicators on the state of the public service. The Apex priorities are derived by the National Planning Commission and reflected in Table 7, which shows the related objectives and indicators. A reliable data set and agreed methodology will be needed for subsequent reporting, as there are no baselines or targets set yet.

Table 6 Outcome 12 MTSF

Objective	Indicator	Minister/ Institution	Baseline	2019 target	Frequency
Stable political-administrative interface	Retention of HoDs measured by the average number of years spent in a post	PSA	As at 30 September 2011, an HoD spent an average of 2.6 years in a post	At least 4 years	Annually

Table 7 Apex priorities to measure NDP implementation

Goal	Objectives	Indicators
<p>Goal 11: Building a capable and developmental state. This comprises nine priorities with twenty-five indicators. Following the structure of the NDP, these are grouped together in three main areas: stabilising the political-administrative interface, local government and SOEs.</p>	<p>11.1 Stabilising the political-administrative interface:</p> <p>Objective 42: Professionalise the public service</p>	<p>Indicator 121: Security of tenure of DGs and senior management</p> <p>Indicator 122: Performance management</p> <p>Indicator 123: Separation of political and administrative decision-making in respect of departmental management</p> <p>Indicator 124: Qualifying exams to serve in the public service</p> <p>Indicator 125: Strengthened merit-based appointments</p> <p>Indicator 126: Change (amendment) of section 3 of the Public Service Act.</p>

Centralization of HoD management

The diagnostic study informing Chapter 13 of the NDP, including evidence generated by the PSC and academia, provides a collective body of evidence. Progress is noted on the following key recommendations of the NDP with regard to HoD management:

- ◆ Greater job security for DGs and HoDs through a Cabinet decision of recruiting for 5 year contracts
- ◆ Improvement in the adoption of Performance Agreements from 16% for national in 2007/08 to 69% in 2012 as reported by the PSC. While this falls short of PSC's target of 100%, the improvement is noted.
- ◆ Instituting an administrative approach for lower-level appointments, giving senior officials full authority to appoint staff in their departments.
- ◆ Aligning performance of the HoDs with performance of their respective departments.

Other proposals included simplifying performance management as per the regulations, centralise the performance system of HoDs and implement a dispute resolution mechanism, which would be facilitated by the Minister of the Public Service Administration (MPSA) and/or Deputy President (PSC, 2009). Little progress is noted in this regard.

Creating an administrative Head of the Public Service (HoPS) was a key recommendation of the NDP and PSC, to ensure effective and impartial management of HoDs, including career progression (NPC 2011; PSC 2009; 2017). This is in line with international experience. Elected political leaders' are concerned that the right 'fit' is needed, with the focus on achieving developmental priorities and sector objectives. Thus, a hybrid model was proposed where features of both meeting EA needs in finding the right fit (and ensuring alignment with national plans), and promoting professionalism (career pathing) for administrative heads. However, neither the establishment of the HopS nor the design of a hybrid model received traction in the last two administrations (2009; 2014), despite several channels of reporting and using lessons from international evidence.

Since 2009, the PSC has proposed the development of a standardised protocol to manage relationships between political principals and administrative heads, improve systems of accountability and implement a compulsory HoDs induction Programme into public administration (PSC 2009). These are in the process of being implemented.

5.3. Determining actual tenure using administrative data

The Personnel and Salary System (PERSAL) data, made available for analysis, is a computerized online integrated system used by all national and provincial government departments (including SAPS and Correctional Services, but excluding Defence) to manage all aspects of government regulations, prescripts, instructions and policies regarding human resources (GTAC 2018). It has been in operation since 1990 and is the consolidation of twenty former non-standardised systems.

The total dataset has close to 200 million records - 15 million records for each of the twelve years. The data considered is broad in coverage, both in terms of the time span and spheres of government covered and the analysis is based on complete PERSAL transactional records for the period 2006/07 to 2017/18. A total of 152 national and provincial departments included in Schedules 1 and 2 of the Public Service Act were analysed. The fields used for the extraction of DG data and analysis is provided in Table 8. The values occurring for each field are given as frequency tables and will be useful to update the dataset.

Table 8 Summary of fields

Step	Field name	Description
Data extraction	Post Level Description	A structured field indicating level of post, e.g. DG, DDG
	Job Title	A non-standardised field to describe the job title of personnel
Analysis	provdept	A code representing a department. Apart from spelling variations in the data, departments' names changed over time, new departments were established and some portfolios were combined. The code is more stable over time.
	Start group	Created to separate heads who started during different periods. The periods were selected to coincide with election years - 2006/07 to 2009/10, 2010/11 to 2013/14 and 2014/15-2017/18. The group who started on or before month 1 were separated as their actual start month is not known.
	natprov	All provinces and national departments
	Age Group	The age at the end of the term is used.
	Years Of Service Group	Total years of service recorded in PERSAL. This includes experience at lower levels in government and excludes experience in entities outside of national and provincial government departments.
	Race	Race group
	Gender	Gender

Survival measure

The duration of terms was analysed in terms of the proportion of heads who “survived” a specific number of months. Survival measures were used as a more appropriate method than determining averages. The survival of different groups and median term durations were also compared. There were almost 100 terms with start month equals to one. This referred to the group of heads who started before or on the start month of the data. Since we do not know their actual start month, we could not accurately calculate their term duration. There were around 125 DGs with end of term equals to the last month of the data (month number 144) on the “Terms end time” data. These heads were still active at the last month of the data. Their term duration could not be included, as it was not completed. Thus, some level of censoring was necessary, as not all the terms were included in the survival analysis.

Data description

Table 9 Number of Departments included

Eastern Cape	Free State	Gauteng	KwaZulu Natal	Limpopo	Mpumalanga	North West	Northern Cape	Western Cape	National	Total
13	12	14	14	12	12	12	11	13	39	152

As can be seen in Table 9, a total number of 152 departments was included in this analysis. Term duration overall and the effect of province, age, years of service in the public service, race and gender was analysed. The term of a DG had to be derived from the PERSAL records. The data

included 398 individuals who served as heads during 2006/07 to 2017/18 (see Table 10). There was a degree of rotation of DGs within and between departments where 65 individuals served as head more than once, while the majority 333 (84%) – were heads for one term only.

Table 10 DGs serving in one or more departments

Number of terms	1	2	3	4	5
DGs	333	53	10	1	1

Exclusions - A completed term is a term which started and ended during the period of analysis. Heads who were present in the first month were excluded from some calculations, as they started prior to that and we did not have reliable data to calculate the duration of their terms. Similarly, heads who were still active in March 2018 had not completed their terms and were excluded from some of the calculations.

Table 11 Start of terms

Term started	Group 1: 2006/07-2009/10	Group 2: 2010/11-2013/14	Group 3: 2014/15-2017/18
Years observed	9 to 12 years	5 to 8 years	0 to 4 years
Number of terms analysed	159	208	111

Groups 1 and 2 were analysed to ensure that all terms could be monitored for a minimum of 4 years. Terms which started between 2014/15 and 2017/18 were excluded from this analysis. The survival of heads was analysed by considering when the term started, the province, and age, race, gender and experience of the head. A break-down of the different groups and their start of terms can be seen in Table 11.

Constructing a sample

The process included identifying DGs, restructuring the data, summarising the data, using a measure for analysis (average used commonly) and determining factors which have an influence on term duration. There is no dedicated field in PERSAL, which can be used to identify DGs. All persons who were at Salary Levels 14, 15 and 16 during any of the years 2006/07 to 2017/8 were selected to include situations where the head of the department was not at Salary Level 16. It should also be noted that PERSAL includes data of some entities, which are not relevant to this analysis. Furthermore, Schedules 1 and 2 of the Public Service Act were used to identify national and provincial departments and to determine which Offices of the Premier to include.

A combination of post level, job title, department and month served was used to identify heads of departments. The Post Level relates to the post a person is occupying, and in PERSAL this field also includes a range of other roles e.g. special advisors which are not relevant to this analysis. As Post Level is not conclusive in identifying heads, departments were analysed separately to identify all persons who were simultaneously (same month) recorded as Directors General. Further filtering was done by using the job title to identify the most likely person in the role of DG. Job title is useful to distinguish and exclude “advisors” and other obvious job titles that are not part of the scope of this study.

The creation of ‘terms’ data was then constructed. A term is defined as consecutive months during which a person is head of a specific department. According to this definition, when a head transferred to another department as head, there is a break in term and a new term is initiated. The monthly records were transformed into terms with a start month, end month, duration and details about the person and department. Terms were the basic units of analysis. Not all the terms were relevant to the analysis. Terms which started towards the end of the dataset were excluded to avoid confusion between the actual end of the term and the end of observation of data. Terms which started prior to the observation of the data were also excluded, as the actual duration of such terms could not be derived accurately from the available data.


Data limitations

In a few cases there were overlaps – two DGs in the same month which occurred at the end of the one and the beginning of the other one’s terms, presumably a handover issue. In a few cases it was not clear from the available fields who the actual DG was. In such cases both records were retained. Furthermore, some departments were headed by deputy director generals. More specific data is required to allow the analysis of permanent vs acting appointments as there was no such distinction available in the PERSAL datasets. For this analysis, an inclusive approach was followed in selecting the head of the department with the result that both heads and acting heads were included. The configuration of departments changed during the 12 years considered through the addition of new departments from existing ones, renaming, and/or regrouping portfolios, e.g. the national Education department was split into Basic Education and Higher Education and Training. Such changes do not necessarily constitute breaks in the terms of heads and were handled on a case by case basis.

5.3.1. DG/HoD Survival by start date


GTAC provided both expertise in data sourcing, cleaning and preparation of the data set, as well as the analysis of the large data set. This required skills in big-data analysis, which is available within the public service. Data analysis and specific findings are provided below with variables outlined. Overall, the terms ranged between 3 and 137 months (11 years and 5 months). The average duration of terms was 42 months (3 and a half years). Because of the asymmetric distribution of term duration (few people with very long terms) the median was considered a better measure of average duration (see Figure 2).

Figure 2 Duration of terms of HODs




Survival was measured as the proportion of terms which lasted longer than a specified number of months. Overall, 50% of the terms lasted just over 3 years (37 months). 9% of the terms ended within the first year and 27% within two years (refer to Figure 3). Factors that played a role included the election in 2009 and a Cabinet instruction to change the duration of contracts from 3 to 5 years effective from 1 April 2010 (PSC 2008; 2009).

Figure 3 Survival of heads of departments



The survival of Group 2 (heads who started between 2009/10 and 2013/14) was higher than that of the first group, where 56% of Group 2 survived 3 years compared to Group 1's 47%. Surviving 4 years was almost double as likely for Group 2 (42%) than for Group 1 (25%). The median term duration increased from 34 to 39.5 months over the two periods considered (see Figure 4).

Figure 4 Survival of heads of departments




5.3.2 Factors influencing term duration (tenure)

The data in Table 12 shows that the older age groups (50+) had higher survival rates than the younger groups.

Table 12 Summary of Age (sorted by median term duration)

Age group	Median (months)	Average (months)	Less than 1 year (%)	Less than 2 years (%)	Less than 3 years (%)	Number of terms
Below 40	23	23.7	20	50	70	10
40 to 49	32	35.7	11.1	33.9	58.7	109
50 to 59	46	46.7	7.3	22	35.8	123
60+	55	52	0	4.3	30.4	23
Unknown						2

Figure 5 Survival by Age



Years of experience in government also played a role in term duration of heads. The group with no experience had consistently low survival. The groups with one to five years (96 people) survival was also low, especially after 30 months. The group with 6 to 10 years (38 people) survival rate was similar to those with more than 10 years of experience (refer to Table 13).

Table 13 Summary of Experience (sorted by median term duration)

Years of experience	Median (months)	Average (months)	Less than 1 year (%)	Less than 2 years (%)	Less than 3 years (%)	Number of terms
No experience	10	19.5	58.8	64.7	76.5	17
1 to 5 years	34	37.7	4.2	26	52.1	96
10+	42.5	44.3	8.6	22.4	38.8	116
6 to 10 years	54.5	53	0	23.7	39.5	38

Table 14 Age by years of experience

Age	Years of experience				Total
	None	1 to 5 years	6 to 10 years	10+ years	
Below 40	0	6	2	2	10
40 to 49	7	47	16	39	109
50 to 59	8	35	12	68	123
60+	0	8	8	7	23
Unknown	2	0	0	0	2
Total	17	96	38	116	267

It seems that age and years of experience should be treated separately in this analysis, as they constitute two different groups in this data – the below 40 age group is not the same people as those with no experience (See Table 14 and Figure 5). As can be seen in Table 15 and Figure 6, the number of male heads was almost double the number of females. The survival rates of the two groups were, however, similar.

Table 15 Summary of Gender

Gender	Median (months)	Average (months)	Less than 1 year (%)	Less than 2 years (%)	Less than 3 years (%)	Number of terms
Female	37	42.2	6.7	26.6	48.9	90
Male	37	41.3	10.2	27.1	44.6	177

When considering race, the different groups were uneven in size. As can be seen in Table 16 and Figure 7, the survival rate of the Asian group (only 10 terms) was the lowest, while White and African groups had similar survival rates after one year of service.

Table 16 Summary of Race (sorted by median term duration)

Race	Median (months)	Average (months)	Less than 1 year (%)	Less than 2 years (%)	Less than 3 years (%)	Number of terms
Asian	26	36.1	31.6	51.6	51.6	10
Coloured	31	44.4	4.3	34.8	52.2	23
White	36	42.2	19.0	23.8	42.9	21
African	37	41.7	8.1	25.1	45.0	211

Figure 6 Survival by gender





Figure 7 Survival by race




5.3.3. Departmental turnover

Departments with long serving heads, as well as departments with large turnover of heads, are listed in Annex 3. A comparison of departments has to be done carefully, as one may find a department which has a long serving head as well as high turnover.

More data is, however, required to allow for the analysis of permanent vs acting appointments as there is no clear distinction directly available in PERSAL. For this analysis an inclusive approach was followed in selecting the head of the department with the result that both heads and acting heads were included. It is possible that some acting heads were not included, in cases where it was not clear. Refer to the following figures as an illustration of the number of heads with high turnover at national and provincial levels:

Figure 8 National departments with high turnover of heads



Provincial comparisons

As can be seen in Table 17, the Eastern Cape, Kwa-Zulu Natal and Western Cape provinces had similar high survival rates during the first 3 years. North West had consistently low survival.

Figure 9 Provincial departments with high turnover of heads




Table 17 Summary of Provinces' terms (sorted by median term duration)

Province/Natio	Median (months)	Average (months)	Less than 1 year (%)	Less than 2 years (%)	Less than 3 years (%)	Number of terms
NW	27	28.8	21.4	46.4	67.9	28
GP	33.5	35.9	20	45	50	20
FS	34	39.6	12.9	25.8	54.8	31
LP	34	36	9.4	31.3	53.1	32
M	36	47.2	0	21.1	47.4	19
NC	36	41.1	0	42.9	50	14
EC	43	46	4.2	8.3	20.8	24
KZN	59	48.9	4.8	9.5	33.3	21
WC	64	61.6	7.1	14.3	35.7	14
National departments	38.5	42.8	6.3	23.4	42.2	64

6. Discussion

This study aimed at providing an evidence synthesis in 3 parts: drawing lessons from international literature on the experience of stabilizing the political-administrative interfaces in other countries (regarded as developmental states); contextualizing evidence for South Africa; and providing data-driven analysis from actual observations of DG/HoD survival rates using administrative data from 2006-2018.

A summary of the key findings using the survival measure is provided below:

- ◆ In total, 50% of terms of heads lasted 3 years or less.
- ◆ The percentage survival of DGs from 2006/7-2009/10 was 46% and from 2009/10-2013/14 was 56%, with a median duration of terms being 39 months and 44 months respectively.
- ◆ Age and years of service in government have an impact on the duration of terms – younger groups and groups with no or little experience had lower survival rates.
- ◆ North West and Gauteng had the highest drop-out rates during the first year of service. Northern Cape and Limpopo Province had high drop-out rates between one and two years, while the Free State, Mpumalanga and KwaZulu Natal had relatively high drop-outs between years two and three.
- ◆ The number of male heads is almost double the number of females. The survival rates of the two groups were similar.
- ◆ The race groups were uneven in size. The survival rate of the Asian group (only 10 terms) was the lowest, while African and White groups had the highest and similar survival rates.

Variations in reporting is attributed to the data sources, samples and method of analysis used. When there is an observance of high level of movement within terms in which DGs and HoDs serve, 'averages' are not a reliable measure of turnover. Variations of a few months may seem trivial, though the absence of a reliable data set from which baselines are determined and monitored, provides a risk in measuring progress. Despite the variations, there is consensus that a high turnover rate of DGs and HoDs exists in the South African public service, which has negative outcomes on departmental performance. Some interventions, like increasing the contract term to 5 years may have improved the situation somewhat; the status quo has not changed. There is a need for institutional level agreements to meet all targets and recommendations.

Interventions to improve administrative capacity, clarify roles and address challenges contributing to high turnover rates in South Africa are inadequate and do not address the systemic causes. Even though there has been an extension of contracts from 3 to 5 years since 2009, DGs are experiencing 'professional frustration' when there are tensions in aligning and balancing EA decisions and departmental strategic decisions (PSC 2016; PSC 2017). The lack of a agreed national priorities results in changes in the approach and direction, which then opens doors for other members of the department to undermine heads in order to serve the interests of the executive. These factors bring about instability, tension, frustration and confusion about a department's mandate and the instability tempers with job security of HoDs. (PSC 2017). Some of these are created by the lack of clarity in roles and responsibilities and inappropriate political interference in daily management (PSC 2017). Retentions strategies to date, if implemented at all, appear to be ineffective.

Due to heightened concerns around corruption, maladministration and ineffective regulatory/oversight mechanisms impacting on the public service in recent years, an increase in the generation of new evidence from academia, media and government itself, is observed. Some have

linked these phenomena directly to unstable administrative leadership, while others draw conclusions and inferences, without a direct causal path. DPSA, DPME and NT, as part of Center of Government functions, have generated specific monitoring and operational evidence on HoD management and reported challenges to clusters and cabinet meetings.

International lessons show that DG and HoD recruitment is carried out as an administrative duty by independent bodies or civil servants. Executive Authorities in developmental countries such as Malaysia and Mauritius are not involved in the appointment of top administrative bureaucrats since the function sits with the head of Public Administration and Public Service Commission. Evidence shows that the absence of meritocratic recruitment in the bureaucracy is generally seen as producing public administrations that are inflated, inefficient, dishonest, and lacking in autonomy from political leaders (Adamolekun 2002; Dasandi 2014; Fritzen 2007; Smith 2009). This is another key area in which political interference can impact the autonomy of the bureaucracy. In many countries, both political loyalty and meritocratic performance can influence promotions. In addition to class and educational background, we found that gender, age and years of experience influences survival.


A feature of a wide range of developmental contexts that demonstrates the closeness of the relationship between politicians and bureaucrats is the presence of 'developmental elite'. This is explicit in the movement between political and bureaucratic positions, i.e. the movement of high-level bureaucrats into political office, and vice-versa. This can be seen in the high number of important Cabinet Ministers that are former senior civil servants in many developmental governments (Leftwich 1995; Charlton 1991). South Africa has a core 'developmental elite' most productive in its early democratic years. The PSC describes this period as having minimal political administrative tensions because a common vision and chemistry between the EA and HoDs existed since they had common backgrounds and comradeship. A shared commitment to the transformation agenda, which was prevalent then, could have been lost in subsequent years (PSC 2017).

7. Conclusion and Recommendations

The PSC remains the main generator of evidence on the problem of HoD turnover and public service effectiveness as it relates to stability, performance and management of HoDs. While the PSC has been instrumental in generating evidence since early 2000, its reports to Parliament on critical findings and recommendations have not been adequately taken up and used for accountability and oversight on government performance. Several recommendations by senior civil servants through the cluster system and official reporting channels have been documented, but there remain little implementation or follow-through.

International evidence on the interface between the political principals and administration heads, show that the centralization of DG/HoD recruitment and management is the direction taken by many States, especially those regarded as 'Developmental States'. The recommendation of a Head of Public Service was made by both the PSC and the NDP, as this report shows. However, reasons for this recommendation not being taken up needs to be interrogated by the new Executive Authority and a decision needs to be taken on whether instituting the Head of Public Service to manage and oversee the appointment of DGs and HoDs is feasible in the SA context.

The findings from this synthesis report suggest that healthy political-bureaucratic relations that support successful reform have the following characteristics:



In order to ensure support to the Ministers in achieving developmental priorities, i.e. responsiveness, while also maintaining a high standard of professionalism in the public service, a hybrid model of HoD recruitment, selection, management and oversight was strongly recommended by key agencies. This will require interventions at political, legal and technical levels. The following high-level recommendations are provided, based on this synthesis report:

Political:

- ◆ Decide on the centralization of DG/HoD management (Head of Public Service), location of oversight functions and performance monitoring.

Legal:

- ◆ Review the legal instruments that guide the appointment, management and assessment of DGs and HoDs, namely the PSA (section 3) and PFMA to seek alignment on responsibility and coherence for maximum impact.

Technical

- ◆ Nominate a task team to design the proposed hybrid model to meet EA needs and DGs/HoD requirements, as recommended in the NDP and provide an implementation plan. Proposals have been made for the inclusion of representation from DPSA, DPME, PSC and NT. This model must take into consideration all options available before recommending the most appropriate model for the SA context and develop an effective theory of change based on the evidence presented in this synthesis report and other related information.
- ◆ Present this hybrid design with recommended legislative reviews to FOSAD and CABINET for political input, finalization and adoption.
- ◆ Develop a standardised protocol to manage political administrative relationships and help improve systems of accountability between EA and HoDs.
- ◆ Design and implement a Compulsory Induction Programme into Public Administration for Heads and develop an HoD transition guide to manage the change process and also a mentorship programme for managing the executive interphase.
- ◆ Establish an interim secretariat in the Presidency to oversee the initiation of the process.

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Annexure 1

International evidence synthesis

Evidence	Year	No: of studies synthesised	Countries included	Source
1. Factors important to the establishment, renewal or rehabilitation of the civil service	2015	117	Somaliland; Uganda; Tanzania; Bougainville; Botswana; Rwanda; Cambodia; Vietnam	GSDRC - Governance and Social Development Resource Center (William Robert Avis)
2. The politics-bureaucracy interface: impact on development reform	2014	177	All studies were focussed on Developing Countries	Dasandi, N. - Developmental Leadership Program, UCL, UK
3. Accountability and Responsiveness in the Senior Civil Service: Lessons from Overseas	2013	7 Country cases	New Zealand; Australia; Singapore; Sweden; France; USA; Canada	Cabinet office, Whitehall, UK
4. Building state capacity for inclusive development	2013	175	Wide range of countries undergoing Public Sector Reform	ESID – Effective States and Inclusive Development
5. Effectiveness of demand-led technical assistance and cooperation on public sector reforms	2012	7 Reviews	Middle East and North Africa (MENA)	GSDRC – Governance and Social Development – resource center – for DFID
6. Study on the Political Involvement in Senior Staffing and on the Delineation of Responsibilities Between Ministers and Senior Civil Servants	2007	Survey of 12 country contexts	Belgium; Denmark; France; Italy; Korea; Mexico; New Zealand; Poland; Sweden; UK; USA; South Africa	OECD Working Papers on Public Governance 2007/6

Annexure 2

Included primary studies as the evidence base for South Africa

Government
 Academia
 Public Service Commission
 Media

Study	Year	Author
1. Directive on the Performance management and development system (PMDS)	2018	DPSA
2. Heads of Departments – Performance Management Guideline	2018	DPME
3. Machinery of government change in South Africa's post-democratic public administration	2018	PARI – Viothan Naidoo
4. Human resource practices in State Institutions: Perspectives of Public servants	2018	PARI – Joel Pearson & Thatshisiwe Ndlovu
5. Challenges regarding the political-administrative interface and its intervention	2017	Public Service Commission
6. Political Musical Chairs: Turnover in the national executive and administration since 2009	2017	SA Institute of Race Relations
7. Recruitment, retention, career pathing and utilization of senior management service members' expertise and skills	2017	Public Service Commission
8. Rapid turnover of DGs worries PSC	2017	Business live
9. Building a capable, career-oriented and professional public service to underpin a capable and developmental state in South Africa	2016	Public Service Commission
10. A study on the workload of Directors-General and Heads of Department	2015	DPME
11. Impact and Implementation Evaluation of Government Coordination Systems	2014	DPME
12. The DG merry-go-round	2014	McCan, J. and Grant, L. 2014 (Mail & Guardian)
13. Building a capable and developmental state – chapter 13 of the NDP	2013	DPME – National Development Plan
14. Strategic Plan 2015-2020	2013	DPSA
15. The high cost of revolving DG syndrome	2013	City Press
16. The short life of a DG in the regime of Jacob Zuma	2013	Times live/Sunday Times
17. Horizontal coordination, government performance and national planning: The possibilities and limits of the South African state	2011	Kraak, A
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19. Proposal on different options of the multi-tiered executive system	2009	Public Service Commission
20. Consultative Report on the Appointment and Management of Heads of Department in the Public Service	2009	Public Service Commission
21. Report on the Turnover Rate of HoDs and its implications for the public service	2008	Public Service Commission
22. Report on Strategic issues emanating for the evaluation of HoDs	2008	Public Service Commission
23. State of the Public Service	2007	Public Service Commission
24. Guide for accounting officers - PFMA	2000	National Treasury

Annexure 3

Departments with heads serving more than 6 years

National/Province	Department	Months
National Departments	Science And Technology	144
National Departments	Statistics South Africa	138
National Departments	Environmental Affairs	97
National Departments	Health	94
National Departments	The Presidency	89
National Departments	Rural Development And Land Reform	80
National Departments	Social Development	79
National Departments	Sport And Recreation South Africa	78
National Departments	Higher Education And Training	77
National Departments	Public Service And Administration	76
National Departments	Justice And Constitutional Development	75
National Departments	National Treasury	72
Northern Cape	Agriculture, Land Reform And Rural Development	144
Western Cape	Agriculture	137
Western Cape	Health	108
Western Cape	Provincial Treasury	105
Mpumalanga	Education	104
Northern Cape	Economic Development And Tourism	104
Mpumalanga	Culture, Sport And Recreation	102
KwaZulu Natal	Finance	101
Mpumalanga	Public Works, Roads And Transport	100
Western Cape	Cultural Affairs And Sport	96
Western Cape	Economic Development And Tourism	96
Western Cape	The Premier	94
Northern Cape	Office Of The Premier	93
Free State	Education	92
Limpopo Province	Provincial Treasury	90
Free State	Cooperative Governance And Traditional Affairs	89
Eastern Cape	Human Settlements	87
Gauteng	Education	84
Eastern Cape	Sport, Recreation, Arts And Culture	84
Western Cape	Education	81
Free State	Agriculture and Rural Development	80
Northern Cape	Education	79
Northern Cape	Roads And Public Works	78
Limpopo Province	Economic Development, Environment And Tourism	78
Western Cape	Local Government	75
Free State	Human Settlements	75
Western Cape	Environmental Affairs And Development Planning	75
Mpumalanga	Agriculture, Rural Development And Land Administration	74
Free State	Police, Roads And Transport	74